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CORPORATE CONSOLIDATION AND THE
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER:
PROPOSALS FOR REVITALIZATION OF
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
FOR fifty years there has been a steady trend toward a centralization of
power within industrial America. Each succeeding study has shown a greater
proportion of the industrial economy dominated by huge corporate entities,1
1. In 1929, 130 corporations, each capitalized at more than $100,000,000, controlled
nearly 82% of all the assets of the 573 corporations whose stock was traded on the New York
Stock Exchange. By 1933, 0.15% of the corporations of the nation owned 53.2% of all cor-
porate assets. WILCOX, COMPETIoN AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 299 (TNEC
Monograph 21, 1940). According to the War Production Board, 100 corporations handled
approximately 75% of all prime war contracts. Hearings before Subrommitlee No. 3 of Mke
Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 2357, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945) (cited hereafter as
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the growth of which has been largely characterized and achieved by the
acquisition or consolidation of smaller corporations. 2 Public concern in the
trend was commanded by two separate, yet interrelated considerations: first,
the lessening of the competitive factor in industries dominated by larger
and fewer competitive units;3 and secondly, the political ramifications of
the increasing concentration of private economic power.4 Evidence of such
concern is to be found in the Sherman ' and Clayton Acts,' and it has been
1945 HEAINGS). Less than 1y2% of all of the industrial employers in the United States
employ about 55% of all the industrial workers. Id. at 13.
While a recent study demonstrates that the largest corporations failed to increase as
rapidly as did their smaller competitors during the war period and immediately thereafter,
Financial Trends of Large Manufacturing Corporations, 1939-1946, Survey of Current Busi-
ness, Nov. 1947, p. 16, the report correctly notes that: "these changes, however, must be
interpreted in the light of the usual cyclical factors which influence the behavior of firms of
different size. Experience indicates that incomes of smaller concerns are typically more
sensitive to cyclical swings in business activity, and that as a consequence the relative im-
portance of the largest corporations regularly increases in depression and is reduced in
prosperity." Id. at 24.
2. The share of the small firms in total net manufacturing income was cut from 23%
in 1918 to 11.5% in 1942. MONOPOLY SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE Co0IMrI rE ON SNIALL
BuSINESS, UNITED STATES VERSUS ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND MONOPOLY 383 (1946).
Manufacturing businesses employing less than five hundred persons accounted for 51.7% of
the total manufacturing employment in 1939. By 1944 they accounted for only 38.1% of
this t6tal. Firms with less than fifty employees in 1939 accounted for 34% of the total em-
ployment, but by 1943 they represented only 25% of the total. Id. at 97. This decrease in
the portion of the economy made up of small corporations has been effectuated in large part
by acquisition by large corporations, judging from the vast number of mergers occurring in
the past fifty years. Podell, Our Anti-Trust Laws and the Economic Situation, 17 A.B.A.J.
255, 256 (1931), FTC, RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF LARGE, MEDIUM-SIZED, AND SMIALL Busi-
NEss 111, 128 (TNEC Monograph 13, 1941), Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-
Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. RPv. 179, 1§0 (1932).
Four distinct waves of mergers are discernible in the past half century. The first, from
1890 to 1904, was motivated both by the onslaught of mass production and by the drive for
monopoly status. FTC, op. cit. supra at 111-2. The second and extraordinary movement
of the twenties was largely financial in origin, and was inspired by the opportunities for pro-
moters' profits in the capitalization of increased assets and of intangible values realized
through the sale of new securities. Id. at 128, 135. A third merger period, during the late
thirties, was activated principally by the desire for marketing outlets and distributive
economies, id. at 136, while a fourth, now pending, seems encouraged by the accumulation
of large wartime working capital, by the unbalanced activities of many companies, and by
the desire to achieve a strong strategic position before the return to a buyers' market. New
Mergers, New Motives, Business Week, Nov. 10, 1945, p. 68; Trend to Mergers, Business
Week, Sept. 9, 1944, p. 52; Merge and Save, Newsweek, June 17, 1946, p. 76; Get-Togethers,
Time, Aug. 5, 1946, p. 86; Growth of Business Units: Effect of War and Shortages, United
States News, May 10, 1946, p. 48.
3. FTC, op. cit. supra note 2, at 132-40; WILcox, op. cit. supra note 1, at 121-89; see
generally BURNS, TnE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936).
4. See the statement of Senator O'Mahoney discussing the potential political power of
several of the nation's giant corporations. 1945 HEARINGS 7-13. See also WILCOX, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 18; Note, 54 YALE L. J. 860, 866 (1945).
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1940).
6. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1940). See also § 304 of the Taft-Hartley
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in an effort better to effectuate this legislation that Congress has, since
1945, been re-examining the limitation placed on intercorporate stock hold-
ing by Section 7 of the Clayton Act,7 which provision has failed to offer more
than a slight deterrent to the concentrative trend.8
MERGERS-METHODS AND CAUSES: RELATION TO COMPETITION
An understanding of the merger device is prerequisite to a consideration
of legislation intended to inhibit its use. The control of separate corporations
may be accomplished in a variety of ways. Although acquisition of a major-
ity of a corporation's outstanding voting stock may be necessary to a true
parent-subsidiary relationship and assured domination, the holding of as
little as ten percent may well be sufficient to permit actual control.0 Com-
pleted unification may be effected by sale of physical assets with majority
approval, or by technical merger or consolidation for which consent of two-
thirds of all classes of stock is commonly required. In either case the actual
consideration may be securities of the acquiring corporation or cash.' 0 In
form there are important differences in the foregoing methods of combina-
tion; in terms of control and competitive results, they are almost identical.
The incentives to corporate expansion-policies and the impelling reasons
for specific mergers and consolidations are legion. And while mergers may
be justifiable from the standpoint of the firms concerned," it does not follow
Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 23, 1947) which forbids corporations to
make political contributions or expenditures in connection with federal elections.
7. Section 7 (originally Section 8) of the Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1940). Extensive hearings have been held by a subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, both in 1945, 1945 HEAlRNGs, and in 1947, Hearings before Subrommittee
No. Z of the Committee on the Judiciary on HR. 515, 80th Cong., 1st Seas. (1947) (cited here-
after as 1947 HEARINGS).
8. Asked if the FTC has been able to stop any mergers or consolidations by means of
the Clayton Act since 1934, the Chairman -of the Commission replied: "No; we have not,
tI'. Chairman. And we have stated in a report to the Congress that that provision has
become a dead letter and could not be enforced for the reasons cited, and we did not see any
point in continuing the efforts that would all result in the same way." 1945 HFARnioS 6S.
9. 10% is the standard of control set by the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
49 STAT. 806 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(7)(A)(1941). In some circumstances, even a smaller
percentage may suffice. Swift & Company, Crown-Zellerback Corporation, American Can
Company, National Lead Company, and Warner Brothers' Pictures, Inc., seem to be exam-
ples of corporations which are controlled by interests holding less than 10% of the voting
shares. PonvY, Lummau, AND CaRTER, CoRroaTE CoNcE TRo. A.ND PUBLIC POLICY
81(1942).
10. GERSTENBERG, FnAxCIAL ORGANIZATION AND M% AcME.S T 655-40 (2d rev. ed.
1946).
11. The most common reasons for mergers are found in the dynamic character of busi-
ness life, which seems in its multitudinous decisions to compel expTansion for survival.
Whitmore, Expansion Policies of 200 Companies, 1945 HEARINGS 22. Reduction of overhead,
the dilution of sales and advertising costs, the spread of risk and assumed stabilization of
investment, the elimination of seasonal -ariation, the desire for additional capital, the lower-
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that the results of all are in the public interest. Any type of merger tends
to produce a concentration of power with dangerous political implications;
but the economic effects are dependent upon the particular type of merger
involved and upon the nature of the market structure in the industry.
Study of the effect on competition of horizontal mergers, i.e., unification
of corporations within the same industry performing similar functions in
the productive process, has shown that the monopolistic components of
price are likely to be present in a greater degree where the number of com-
petitors is few, or, when the number is larger, where one or several are large
enough to dominate the field.12 Price fixing through price leadership or
through domestic or international agreements becomes more probable; and
competition tends to be diverted on a large scale into advertising. 3
Acquisitions extending vertical integration in an industry, i.e., a combina-
ing of taxes, and the assurance of supplies are all factors constantly in the minds of business-
men, and the results may often be achieved most easily by acquisition of a corporation with
the desired features. Hamilton, The Problem of Anti-Trust Reform, 32 COL. L. REV. 173
(1932); Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. REV. 179, 267
(1932); New Mergers, New Motives, Business Week, Nov. 10, 1945, p. 68. Another important
reason for such acquisitions is the desire of corporate managements-whose stock interests
are often slight-to utilize accumulated profits to gain control of other corporations, thereby
increasing management's prestige and power, instead of to provide increased dividends for
stockholders. BRADY, BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER (1943). For discussion of particular
reasons and particular mergers, see CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
118, 170 (5th ed. 1946); 1945 HEARINGS, 176, 180, 206; FTC, op. cit. supra note 2, at 104,
129, 219-20, 228, 233; HAMILTON AND TILL, ANTI-TRUST IN ACTION 118 (TNEC Mono-
graph 16, 1940). See also Fuld, Some Practical Aspects of a Merger, 60 HARP. L. REV. 1092
(1947).
12. During the depression years of 1929 to 1932 very little change appeared in tile
price of products of industries dominated by one or few producers, while the prices in non-
concentrated industries were falling sharply. MONOPOLY SUBCOM.I1TTEE, Op. Cit. supra
note 2, at 92. But see NEAL, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND PRICE INFLEXIBILITY (1942).
An interesting example of the monopolistic effect upon the economy of dominance of an
industry by a few large firms can be seen in American Tobacco Company v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 (1946); see also Rostow, The New Sherman Act, 14 U. OF CHl. L. REv. 507,
580-6 (1947).
13. The reason why a small numbe; of concerns can often exercise considerable control
over prices in their industry has been set out by Rostow, supra note 12, at 576-7: "Such
sellers are conscious in every phase of their market policy of the fact that what they do will
have an effect on the market as a whole. Their output is a significant share of total supply.
If they produce more, it can be sold only at a sacrifice of price. If they alter their policy as
to price or output, they know that their rivals will follow suit. A price cut therefore can
rarely change any seller's share of the market. It can only lead to a decline in the profits of
all sellers, unless the elasticity of demand is considerable-and monopolistic sellers habitually
underestimate the elasticity of demand for their products. Fear of spoiling the market is
therefore a deep-seated and characteristic quality of many markets dominated by a few
large firms." This phenomenon, as well as its results on advertising and cartels, is discussed
in: BURNS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 76; CHAMBERLIN, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 7; HAMILTON
AND TILL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 14; HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS 40-45 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941);
WILCOX, op. cit. supra note 1, at 121; 1945 HEARINGS 231.
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tion of corporations performing different functions in the process of manu-
facture and distribution of a particular product, may lead to monopolistic
price conditions if such conditions already are present in one of the constit-
uent horizontal sectors. In the petroleum industry, for example, control
of the pipelines by the major refiners often enables them to prevent compet-
itors from distributing gasoline in the market areas, by charging exorbitant
rates for the piping of crude oil. The result is a diminution of competition, 14
and such an effect in any industry will often lead to defensive integration
on the part of competitors. While competition may remain in such an oligo-
polistic industry, study of particular vertical mergers is justified to ascertain
if they may not, in fact, tend toward monopoly.15
Mergers promoting diversification of output and geographic extension are
very similar in their relation to competition. Not in themselves harmful,
such mergers nevertheless warrant investigation to guard against possible
future deleterious effects upon competion. 0
MERGERS AND SECTION SEVEN
The weakness of the Clayton Act in meeting the outlined problems of
corporate unification finds its genesis in ambiguous and conflicting wording.
Section 7, implemented by the enforcement provisions of Section 11,17 pro-
scribes stock acquisition in any one of three situations:
"Where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so ac-
quired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain
such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a
monopoly of any line of commerce."18
14. For discussion of these conditions see Comment, 51 YALE L. J. 1338 (1942).
15. Professor Stigler says: "It is arguable that most of the important advantages of
vertical integration partake of a monopolistic nature." Stigler, The Extent and Bases of
Monopoly, AmszL EcoN. REv. Supp. No. 2, p. 1, 22 (1942). See also Bufns, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 421. In the present wave of mergers very few are of the vertical variety. IV=
Mergers, New Motives, Business Week, Nov. 10, 1945, p. 77.
16. An objective observer might find many of the diversifications of questionable
value, and feel that they resulted in a corporation too complex for any management to
operate efficiently, FTC, op. cit. supra note 2, at 116, but mergers of this type, known as
either complementary or chain mergers, have become increasingly more important since
1920. New Mergers, New Motives, Business Week, Nov. 10, 1945, p. SO.
17. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1940). This section provides that the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronau-
tics Authority, and the Federal Reserve Board shall exercise jurisdiction over their respec-
tive provinces, and gives the Federal Trade Commission authority in all other cazes. The
normal procedure is for the FTC to issue a complaint where it suspects a violation, hold a
hearing, and then issue a stock divestiture order. The role of the Justice Department in
Section 7 enforcement is discussed in note 47 infra.
18. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1940). The section makes exceptions for the
purpose of investment, and for true parent-subsidiary relationships.
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Handicapped by the lack of a clear expression of Congressional intent,"
courts, interpreting the first standard, have been particularly perplexed in
determining whether the area in which competition must be lessened is the
industry as a whole, or only the corporations which are party to the acquisi-
tion. A literal reading of the wording of the clause would seem to indicate
that competition between the corporations involved is the criterion to be
applied. Further it is claimed that the Clayton Act was intended for the
prophylactic purpose of preventing restraints on competition in their in-
fancy,2 and a holding that the area of concern is the industry would be to
make the test essentially similar to that of the Sherman Act.21
On the other hand, it is contended that where any competition exists
between two corporations it is not only "substantially lessened," but in fact
entirely eliminated by merger; and thus the first interpretation would outlaw
every merger between even slightly competing corporations, a result belied
by the very existence of the qualification. Furthermore, unless the industry
as a whole is the area to be used as the test, the first clause would comprehend
all mergers and the last two would be superfluous. 2 And it is argued that
the principal purpose of the Clayton Act was not to supplement the Sherman
Act by attacking monopolies in their incipiency, but rather to reduce busi-
ness unceitainty by enumeration of outlawed practices.
23
19. Almost every conceivable viewpoint and interpretation of tile proposed statute
may be found in the Congressional debates on Section 7. The debate is reported in 51
CONG. REc., parts 9 and 14, passim (1914).
20. Counsel for the FTC told the House Committee that the Clayton Act was aimed
at getting mergers "in their incipiency" and "nipping the whole thing in the bud." 1945
HEARINGS 51, 56. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 68 Sup. Ct. 12 (1947). Most
observers would, however, agree with Irvine, The Uncertainties of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 14 CORN. L. Q. 28 (1928), that at least of coordinate importance to Congress was the
reduction of business uncertainty through the enumeration of outlawed practices. See Levy,
The Clayton Law-An Imperfect Supplement to the Sherman Law, 3 VA. L. REv. 411 (1916);
Note, 34 CoL. L. Rnv. 968 (1934).
21. Under the Sherman Act there was no question but that the test of monopolistic
practices and power was the effect upon the industry. Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). At the time of passage of the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act
was believed to have been emasculated by the Supreme Court's "rule of reason," which con-
demned not all monopolistic practices but only those which were "unreasonable." Standard
Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106 (1911). See 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 591 (1948), and particularly id. at 593, n. 17.
22. See Commissioner Van Fleet's dissenting memorandum in Fisk Rubber Co., 10
F.T.C. 433 (1926). The last two clauses might, however, still be meaningful as applied
against vertical mergers and mergers for the purpose of diversification.
23. Note, 38 YALE L. J. 830 (1929); see also note 20 supra. Neither courts nor Com-
missioners have concealed their attempts to write the Sherman Act into the Clayton Act.
Dissenting in Matter of Temple Anthracite Coal Co., 13 F.T.C. 249, 262 (1930), Commis-
sioner Humphrey said, at 263: "I cannot believe that the mere acquisition by one corpora-
tion of the stock of two or more competing corporations is a violation of the law, even if the
competition between the competing corporations is thereby eliminated. I think the test is
whether such acquisition results in restraining commerce."' On appeal Humphrey's attitude
was apparently adopted, and the Commission's decision reversed. Temple Anthracite Coal
[Vol. 57: 613
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The issue presented by this conflict of views has never been definitively
settled by the courts. In the early leading case of International Shoe Company
v. Federal Trade Commission 24 the Supreme Court applied the test of the
corporations to measure the effect upon competition of the merger of two of
the largest firms in the shoe industry, and finding little direct competition
between the two firms, permitted the merger.-5 In the few cases since de-
cided, however, lower courts have tended to use the industry test.s
Another vexing problem, foreseen by Congress at the time the Clayton
Act was passed, has been to determine what constitutes a "substantial
lessening of competition." 2 It has been dearly decided that a "substantial
lessening of competition" requires that substantial competition exist prior
to the merger in question, 21 but the amount of competition which will be
called "substantial" has not been finally determined, and the courts have
decided each case on its own merits. -3
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 51 F.2d 656 (C.C.A. 3d 1931). The Third Circuit re-
duced the Clayton Act to a restatement of the Sherman Act in a case under Section 3 of the
former, Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 282 Fed. 81 (C.C.A. 3d 1922), aff'd
sub nor. Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923), when it
said, at 87: "The only standard of legality with which we are acquainted is the standard
established by the Sherman Act."
24. 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
25. The Court's finding that there was no substantial competition between the merging
companies upset the conclusion of the Commission, Matter of International Shoe Co., 9
F.T.C. 441 (1925), and of the circuit court of appeals, International Shoe Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 29 F.2d 518 (C.C.A. Ist 1928). Justices Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis,
dissenting, found sufficiently substantial competition to justify the Commision's order, and
criticized the majority for endeavoring to substitute its view for that of the appropriate ad-
ministrative agency.
26. The same courts have been wont to speak of "public injury" as an additional re-
quirement for action under Section 7, but the decisions indicate that this means, in fact, only
that the industry test is being employed. V. Vivaudou v. Federal Trade Commission, 54
F.2d 273 (C.C.A. 2d 1931); United States v. Republic Steel Co., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D.
Ohio 1935). See also dissent of Commissioner Humphrey in Matter of Arrov-Hart & Hege-
man, Inc., 16 F.T.C. 393, 423 (1932); 33 Ops. A'rr'Y GEq. 225, 241 (1922); Irvine, supra
note 20, at 40. But cf. In re Pressed Steel Car Co. of N.J., 16 F. Supp. 329 (\W.D. Pa. 1936);
Parkersburg Rig and Reel Co., 34 F.T.C. 1527 (1941); see Ronald Fabrics Co. v. Verney
Brunswick Mills, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. SERv. 57,514 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); PUaDY, Lumum,
.N CARTER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 364.
27. Congressman Volstead told the House: "No one can tell how the word 'substantial'
will be construed. As used in this section it may mean that the competition must be largely
lessened. This word 'substantial' is so indefinite that it affords the courts no guide. As
applied to the facts in any ordinary case of conflicting testimony it will give them a license
to hold that anything short of almost entire elimination of competition is legal." 51 ConG.
Rnc. 9078 (1914).
28. International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 US. 291 (1930); V. Vi-
vaudou v. Federal Trade Commission, 54 F.2d 273 (C.C.A. 2d 1931); Matter of Vanadium-
Alloys Steel Co., 18 F.T.C. 194 (1934); see Comment, 39 YALE L. J. 1042, 1044 (1930);
NATIONAL INusmRIAL CONFEPENcE BOARD, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COnPL-TrnTv PRAC-
TIcEs 220 (1929).
29. Decisions construing Section 7 and Section 3, which uses the phrase "to substan-
1948]
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Yet a third ambiguity in the wording of Section 7 which has proven trou-
blesome has been the use of the phrase, "may be." " Although the effect
of these words would seem to be to prohibit any stock acquisition which
would possibly cause a substantial lessening of competition, and such an
interpretation would be supported by the legislative history of the Act, 1
courts have uniformly required a showing that a merger would probably
lessen competition, or tend to monopoly.
3 2
A more important defect in the Act was its failure to control merger by
acquisition of assets, i.e., direct purchase of corporate properties. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission, charged with the enforcement of the Act, early
ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the purchase of assets. 3 The Supreme
Court continued this emasculation of the Act in 1925 in Thatcher Manufac-
turing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.34 The Court there held, four justices
tially lessen competition" in a similar manner, have ranged over a wide variety of inter-
pretations. In V. Vivaudou v. Federal Trade Commission, 54 F.2d 273 (C.C.A. 2d 1931),
the court could find no substantial lessening of competition in the merger of two directly
competing corporations with combined annual sales of seven million dollars in a 125 million
dollar industry, while in Matter of Vanadium-Alloys Steel Co., 18 F.T.C. 194 (1934), the
F.T.C. dissolved a merger where the product manufactured in common by the merging
companies constituted 22.5% of the total output of one of the companies and 54% of the
total output of the other, and where the company emerging from the merger would have
produced 12.5% of the total output of such product in the industry. In International Salt
Co. v. United States, 68 Sup. Ct. 12 (1947) the Supreme Court invalidated tie-in agree-
ments involving a business of $500,000 annually, a minute portion of the total salt business,
and in Oxford Varnish Co. v. Ault & Wiborg Co., 83 F.2d 764 (C.C.A. 6th 1936), Section 3
was used to bar an agreement involving less than 1% of the industry in question.
30. The phrasing of Section 7, "where the effect of such acquisition may be to substan-
tially lessen competition," is similar to that of Section 3, which forbids tie-in clauses where
their effect "may be" to substantially lessen competition.
31. Congress was warned that the phrase "may be" was necessary instead of "is," as
the bill originally provided, in order to make certain that all acquisitions which might possi-
bly lead to a lessening of competition were prevented, 51 CONG. REc. 9201 (1914), and the
bill was unanimously so amended. Id. at 14463-4. Cf. International Salt Co. v. United
States, 68 Sup. Ct. 12 (1947) (§ 3 of Act). See also PURDY, LINDAHL, AND CARTER, op. Cit.
supra note 9, at 364.
32. Interpreting a similar clause in Section 2a of the Clayton Act in Corn Products
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726 (1945), Chief Justice Stone said for the
Court, at 738: "It is to be observed that Section 2a does not require a finding that the dis-
criminations in price havein fact had an adverse effect on competition. The statute is
designed to reach such discriminations 'in their incipiency,' before the harm to competition
is effected. It is enough that they 'may' have the prescribed effect. Cf. Standard Fashion
Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-7. But as was held in the Standard Fashion
case, with respect to the like provisions of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, prohibiting tie-in
clause agreements, the effect of which 'may be to substantially lessen competition,' the use
of the word 'may' was not to prohibit discriminations having the mere possibility of these
consequences, but to reach those which would probably have the defined effect on competi-
tion." In accord is United States v. Republic Steel Co., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935)
(§7 case).
33. Conference Ruling, 1 F.T.C. 541 (1916).
34. 272 U.S. 554 (1926). This opinion also decided the cases of Federal Trade Commis.
sion v. Western Heat Co., and Swift & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.
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dissenting, that although the Commission might include in a stock divestiture
order an injunction against asset acquisition while the stock was being di-
vested, it was without power to order divestment of assets acquired prior
to any Commission action, even though the assets had been acquired only
because of control exercised by stock obtained in violation of Section 7.35
This holding was extended in Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission 3 6 to deprive the Commission of dissolution power if,
after commencement of proceedings, but before issuance of a divestment
order, the acquiring corporation should complete the merger and rid itself
of the stock37 Since almost sixty percent of all recent mergers have been
by asset acquisition,-s it is apparent that the exclusion of such acquisitions
has served narrowly to limit the scope of the Act. Thus, initial statutory
omissions and ambiguities, accentuated by devitalizing judicial interpre-
tation, have led to the abandonment of Section 7 as a weapon of anti-trust
enforcement.39
LEGISLATIVE REVITALIZATION
In 1941 the Temporary National Economic Committee recommended
comprehensive changes in Section 7,11 the most important of which was
provision for compulsory prior approval by the FTC of all asset acquisitions
over a fixed size. Introduced in Congress with slight modification in 1945,41
35. See Comment, 75 U. oF PA. L. REv. 463 (1927). In Atwater v. Wheeling & Lake
Erie Ry., 56 F.2d 720 (C.C.A. 6th 1932), the court refused to void certain contracts made by
directors of a corporation elected by stock which was held in violation of Section 7. It in-
dicated that it could have cancelled the contracts had the contracts themselves substantially
lessened competition, but said: "It has never been held that the acts of directors elected by
stock [illegally held] are void or even voidable." Id. at 723.
36. 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
37. But cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., CCH TRADE REG. SERV. 57,628
(D. Del. 1947), a Sherman Act action in which the government sought a preliminary in-
junction to preserve the status quo until its suit to enjoin a proposed agreement of merger
of steel companies could be decided. The court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining
the defendants from making any transfer of assets or paying or receiving any part of the
purchase price in consummation of the agreement pending final adjudication of the action.
38. During the years 1939-44,479 mergers were accomplished by asset acquisition, 345
by stock purchase, and 8 by an undetermined method. Representatives of the FTC have
expressed the opinion that the mergers by asset acquisition have been almost entirely
motivated by a desire to avoid Section 7. 1945 HEARINGS 68-9.
39. For the FTC's position on Section 7, see note 8 supra. Nor has the Justice De-
partment endeavored to utilize the section. It is interesting to note, however, that a pre-
liminary examiner for the Interstate Commerce Commission has recommended denial of
the application of the president and chairman of the board of the Allegheny Corporation to
sit on the board of directors of the New York Central Railroad because of a belief that the
publicly-announced purpose of the Allegheny Corporation to merge the New York Central
-with the Chesapeake and Ohio would violate Section 7. N. Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1947, p. 55,
col. 8.
40. TNEC, FNAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 38-40 (1941).
41. Senator O'Mahoney introduced S. 615 in the Senate, and Representative Kefauver
introduced an identical bill, H.R. 2357, in the House. 1945 HEARINGS 1. The differences
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these proposals were favorably reported by the House Judiciary Committee,
but were later superseded by a bill, still pending in the present Congress,
42




The TNEC recommendation of prior administrative approval was based
upon the premise that it is both desirable and feasible to determine the
legality of a merger before it has become an accomplished fact-thus obvia-
ting the extraneous economic hazards which militate against upsetting a
completed merger. 44 Prior approval would put an end to newspaper scanning
as a means of discovering possible violations, 4 and would permit a consider-
ation of mergers npon their merits, rather than with an eye to the dangerous
consequences of dissolving that which has once been united. Many govern-
ment regulatory agencies already exercise the power of advance decision, 4
between these bills and the TNEC recommendations were two: (1) the TNEC would have
subjected only asset acquisition to prior approval, while the bills included stock acquisition
as well; (2) the bills also restored the original ambiguous phrases of the Clayton Act, which
had been dropped by the TNEC. Since the bills contained the new standards for prior ap-
proval, the inclusion or exclusion of the old language was a matter of little moment.
42. The House Judiciary Committee unanimously approved H.R. 4810, an amended
version of H.R. 2357, in 1946. When the Rules Committee refused to grant a rule for this
bill, it was replaced by H.R. 5535, which dropped the prior approval system, H.R. $535
was reintroduced as H.R. 515 by Representative Kefauver in the first 1947 session of the
80th Congress. 1947 HEARINGS 6.
43. H.R. 515 merely adds to Section 7 after the provisions relative to the acquisition of
capital stock the words "the whole or any part of the assets." 1947 HEARINGS 1.
44. Such considerations were clearly shown in Pennsylvania R. R. v, Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 66 F.2d 37 (C.C.A. 3d 1933), subsequently affirmed by an evenly divided
Court. 291 U.S. 651 (1934). The Circuit Court said: "We are not primarily concerned with
the economic result of our interpretation of the statute. That is a matter for Congress and
not the courts, but to force all this stock suddenly upon the market might have such a
disastrous effect in these troublous times that it has caused us to consider most carefully
the questions in the case." 66 F.2d 37, 40. Another author has compared the problems of
dissolving a merger to "unscrambling scrambled eggs." HANDLER, A STUDY OF TE CON-
STRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUsT LAWS 88 (TNEC Monograph
38, 1941). See also HAMILTON AND TILL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 96; MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF THE FTC AND TEE ICC 66-71 (1933); Hale, Trust Dissolutions: "Atomizing"
Business Units of Monopolistic Size, 40,COL. L. REv. 615 (1940).
45. "From the beginning, the Commission has had employees assigned the duty of
reading the papers to see if there were any violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. No
such method has been followed in regard to any other class of cases. These employees
immediately report any item that appears in the press involving stock acquisition. Then,
on the merest ex parte showing, without any preliminary hearing as in other cases, complaint
is issued and served upon the respondent. The supposed justification for such action was
that the respondent might acquire the assets and oust our jurisdiction." Commissioner
Humphrey dissenting in Matter of Arrow-Hart & Hegeman, Inc., 16 FTC 393,424 (1932).
46. According to counsel for the Federal Reserve Board, that Board and the FTC are
the only administrative agencies without the authority to give prior approval. 1945 1EAR-
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and the Justice Department has occasionally exercised its right to require
judicial scrutiny of proposed mergers.47 Constant business demand for the
attendant certainty has forced the Anti-trust Division to adopt varying
systems of informal permissive opinions which have been unsatisfactory
both to business and to the Justice Department." Although the proposed
bill promised future immunity for approved acquisitions, and businessmen
had favored some system of prior approval at the time of passage of the Clay-
ton Act,4 the National Association of Manufacturers fought even this pro-
vision in the proposed amendment.
The NAM claimed that its objection to prior approval was grounded on
the delays common to FTC activities, and on the harmful effect such delays
could have in postponing proposed mergers. 0 The Commission's actual av-
erage in merger cases, one year from the time of complaint to dismissal or
order, indicates some valid basis for such fears."' But the objection presup-
oGs 337. For an example of how the Interstate Commerce Commission utilizes Section 7 in
advance of possible violations, see note 39 supra.
47. Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1940), author-
izes and instructs the Justice Department to bring equity proceedings to prevent violations
of the Act. Although valuable, such a technique is not a substitute for prior approvalbe-
cause: it leaves to the judiciary the solution of difficult technical problems which might more
properly be considered by an expert administrative agency; this preliminary surveillance
is not compulsory; the Department of Justice may not hear about a merger until it has be-
come an accomplished fact; and in such cases the Government must, furthermore, aEc-me
the burden of proving that a proposed merger will harm competition, instead of requiring
the merging corporations to prove that their merger is in the public interest. See United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944) (injunction granted); United States
v. Republic Steel Co., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935) (injunction denied).
48. The practice of the Justice Department with regard to informal permi-sive opinions
has varied with the Attorneys General. Such opinions were given as early as 1913, but were
not in demand at that time. By the mid-twenties, however, the pressure from the busines
community "as so great that such rulings had become established practice, even though a
favorable ruling promised immunity only from immediate prosecution. In recent years the
trend has once again been away from such rulings. HAwm ox AD Tn.L, op. cit supra note
11, at 27, 86-7. But see CCH TRADE REG. SERV. 54,124 (1947). For an interesting exam-
ple of prior approval, see 33 0ps. ATT'Y GEN. 225 (1922).
49. Such men of affairs as George ,V. Perkins and Judge Elbert H. Gary, fearful that
the rule of reason dangerously broadened the Sherman Act, advocated before a Congres-
sional Committee the establishment of a commission with authority to give administrative
rulings in advance, thus obviating the uncertainty of the anti-trust laws. Hearings 1-fore the
Senate Committee on Iiterstate Commerce, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1089,2407-11 (1912).
50. ferwrandunt of the National Associalion of Manufacturers, 1945 HEPn;os 369-
70. This memorandum was the only opposition displayed to the bill at the 1945 Hearing3.
51. This figure may be determined from examination of the reported cases over the
period 1916-46. The average figure of thirty-eight months in the NAM's tables, 1945
HEA=RIGs 370, is misleading in that it ignores the many complaints which were speedily
dismissed without a hearing. Although a hearing would, indeed, have been required had the
prior approval sections of the bill been passed, it is reasonable to suppose that the great
bulk of cases would lend themselves to swift decision. A further consideration is that here-
tofore the Commission has considered only cases where there was some reason, however
slight, to believe that there had been a violation of the law. The great majority of mergers
1948]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
poses the impossibility of improvement, and considerable improvement
might be expected to result if the present corporate aim of delaying a poten-
tial dissolution order were replaced by a corporate desire for speedy approval
of projected plans. Legislative directives as to priority and permissible time
limitations, 52 and a lessening of the burden on the Commission by requiring
prior approval only for acquisitions above a prescribed size, 3 could serve as
additional expediting measures.
Despite the advantages which might have accrued from prior approval,
the system was dropped by the Judiciary Committee after it was found im-
possible to gain floor consideration for a bill containing such a proposal.
The Proposed Standards
As presented to the Judiciary Committee, the prior approval system of
the bill would have required merging corporations to carry the burden of
proof in establishing that the proposed unification was consistent with the
public interest as manifested by six criteria. The first three proposed stand-
ards, which were retained in the bill until the entire prior approval system
was deleted, attempted to specify factors relevant to the desired competitive
index. The first standard was to have clarified the old Section 7 criteria-
that a merger must not substantially lessen competition, restrain trade, or
tend to create a monopoly-by applying the lests sectionally as well as na-
tionally, and by explicitly making the whole industry and not the merging
corporations the competitive frame of reference. 4 The second and third
standards would have required that, after the acquisition, the size of the
acquiring corporation and the diminution in the number of competitors
should not be incompatible with "effective competition." The necessity of
an affirmative showing that no possible harm might arise from a merger re-
solves the "may be" problem, but obviously neither this nor the introduction
of the new criteria would bring certainty to Section 7. "Effective competi-
tion" does little to resolve the ambiguities created by the phrase, "to sub-
stantially lessen competition." But certainty cannot be brought into a field
that has no absolutes without also introducing undesirable rigidity. The
to be submitted for prior approval would probably be of the type so clearly lawful that they
are not now considered by the Commission, and under a prior approval system, these would
necessitate little delay in granting permission.
52. See 1945 HEARINGS 64-5.
53. Before rejection of the entire advance approval provision, a proposed limiting size
was amended from a book value figure to a certain percentage of sales within the industry.
1945 HEARINGS 2, 371. Although the latter factor is obviously more relevant to competitive
effect, the more definite figurE seems better adapted as a condition precedent to jurisdiction.
The extent of a particular line of industry is itself a disputable question of fact, and merging
corporations could not be certain that the approval provision applied.
54. "That the acquisition will not substantially lessen competition, restrain trade, or
tend to create a monopoly (either in a single section of the country or in the country as a
whole) in the trade, industry, or line of commerce in which such corporations are engaged."
H.R. 2357 § 7(3)(a), 1945 HEARINGS 2.
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new criteria, moreover, do suggest an area of forbidden monopolistic tend-
ency somewhat broader than those heretofore judicially applied. They con-
tribute by directing administrative attention to the problems of relative size
and oligopoly which, in the view of most economists, have a direct bearing on
competitive practices," but which have only recently been held to be rele-
vant in anti-trust actions.%
The fourth of the proposed standards would have required a showing that
the acquiring corporation had not indulged in unlawful methods of competi-
tion to induce acquisition, and had not otherwise violated the Federal Trade
Commission Act. The first half of this provision, depriving the unfair com-
petitor of the fruits of his illegal action, seems a most appropriate penalty.
The second half, however, which would prevent an otherwise lawful expan-
sion after any unrelated violation, seems undesirable and excessive, since
most of the Commission's reported violations are breaches of minor adver-
tising and labelling regulations.5
The fifth condition of the bill as introduced into the Judiciary Committee
would have compelled proof that the projected acquisition was "not incom-
patible with greater efficiency and economy of production, distribution, and
management," in significant contrast to the more affirmative requirement,
recommended by the TNEC, of proof that the acquisition "will be promotive"
of the same ends. Both tests are founded on the Brandeisian belief that the
public identification of efficiency and economy with greater size is in the
nature of a popular myth, and that bigness may, in some cases, actually be
less efficient 5 The standard of the bill, requiring only proof that the pro-
posed merger would not lead to less efficiency and economy, is demanded by
practical considerations in preference to the more visionary recommenda-
tion of the TNEC which would have allowed only those mergers leading to
55. 1945 HE.RINGS 128, 284, 333, 338; Rostow, supra note 12, at 575-86. See generally
BuRNs, op. cit. supra note 3; CH.AUBER1LN, Op. Cit. supra note 11.
56. The leading case holding that size alone can be so dangerous as to fall within the
ambit of the anti-trust laws is United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d
416 (C.C.A. 2d 1945), 54 YALE L. J. 860 (1945). See HANDLER, A STUDY' OF TuE CousTRuC-
TION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRusT LAws 74 (TNEC Monograph 38,
1941).
57. 1945 HEARINGs 57, 58. For a breakdown of the FTC's activity see Nio. oroLy
SUBCOMmiTTEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 20.
58. "One of the ideas that has confused the public mind and even the minds of public
officials and administrators is that competition results in inefficiency and that concentrated
power is inevitably efficient." Statement of Edwin L. Davis, Commissioner, Federal Trade
Commission, 1945 HEARLNGs 40. It may be pointed out that most of the largest companies
attained their position by mergers and consolidations in which the probabilities of greater
efficiency were often not considered, that absentee management incident to widespread
corporate enterprise is not conducive to efficiency, and that the true technical economies of
mass production are founded only on intraplant processes, while the supposed productive
economies of interplant organizations are largely achieved at the expense of free competition.
FTC, op. cit. supra note 2 passim. See also PURDY, LL'irD..I, AND CARTER, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 351.
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definitely ascertainable economies. 9 Nor is such a stringent rule as that
proposed by the TNEC necessary to the maintenance of effective competi-
tive control, and it might, if read literally, preclude an acquisition aimed
at the real or imagined stability of diversification when no adverse competi-
tive results could be presumed. However, even the milder requirement of
the bill as it went to the Judiciary Committee would add greatly to the
burden of the Commission, since intelligent application of the standard
would require the evolution and articulation of very elaborate administra-
tive measurements, and since few companies would be unable to produce
evidence of expected savings.60 It was, perhaps, for these reasons that the
Committee dropped the provision even while it continued to retain the prior
approval plan.
A sixth standard proposed by the TNEC, a requirement that the corpora-
tion emerging from the consolidation should not control more than a pre-
scribed proportion of its industry,0 1 was omitted from the bill before it was
introduced in Congress. This omission would have shifted the difficult bur-
den of drawing the future line from Congress to the Commission and would
have left no concrete guide for the judiciary in its review of the Commission's
decisions. And to the extent that psychological indisposition to deny to one
what others already have achieved influences judicial decision, this Congres-
sional abdication might have made it more likely that smaller companies
would have been permitted to merge to a size compatible with that of exist-
ing dominant firms. Nonetheless, the omission may have been justified in
the interest of lending flexibility to the administration of the proposed re-
vision of Section 7.
The influence of business representatives in the deletion of these standards
may well prove to have been shortsighted. Although objections were di-
rected to the vagueness of the new rules and the wide administrative discre-
tion they would necessitate, 2 the terminology of the newly proposed stand-
59. It is the feeling of the sponsor of the bill that an administrative agency would hest-
tate to make an affirmative finding that a proposed merger would promote greater efficiency
and economy in any but the most obvious circumstances, and that a large proportion of all
mergers would be blocked on that score alone. Communication to YALE LAw JOURNAL from
Representative Estes Kefauver, Dec. 8, 1947. The political difficulties which would beset
a bill containing such a standard as that suggested by the TNEC are manifest from the
vigor with which counsel for the NAM, who erroneously interpreted the bill to require a
positive finding of greater efficiency, attacked such a provision. 1945 HEARINGS 369.
60. Professor Handler, the actual author of the TNEC proposal, had remarked of such a
standard in 1932 that the test of highest economical efficiency "is unworkable as a practical
matter. The facts are too difficult to ascertain, the evidence too conflicting, and the con-
clusions too uncertain." Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trilst Laws, 32 CoL,. L.
Rav. 179, 268 (1932).
61. The TNEC recommendation did not specify what proportion of their industry
merging corporations were to be permitted to control, and Congress was to have inserted a
figure in the standard, which figure was to be applicable to all industries.
62. One vexing problem left unsolved in the bill may well be within the sphere of par-
ticular competence of administrative discretion, i.e., whether a partial exception should be
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ards is more specific than that of the old, and administrative decisions would
have continued to be subject to judicial review. Loss of the proposed tests,
moreover, may lead to a reinterpretation of the first clause of Section 7 re-
sulting in a literal reading of its language, by which it could be used to pro-
hibit every horizontal merger without regard to total competitive condi-
tions.
It appears desirable that legislation be enacted amending Sections 7 and
11 of the Clayton Act by including acquisition of assets and requiring prior
approval of mergers by the Federal Trade Commission, conditioned upon
the satisfaction of defined standards. The most popular detour about Sec-
tion 7 would be closed by the inclusion of asset acquisition, and the provi-
sion for prior approval of mergers would give Congress an opportunity to
resolve the ambiguities which have arisen in the interpretation of the section
by setting out explicitly which area of competition is to be taken as the test
of a proposed merger, and what is meant by the phrase, "where the effect
may be to substantially lessen competition." But since it is doubtful whether
Congress will amend the Act,6 3 even to the extent of prohibiting asset acqui-
sition, it is probable that any increase in the effectiveness of Section 7 must
be accomplished by judicial decision.
JUDIcIAL RiVITALIZATION
In facing the problems of monopoly control in the past decade, the Su-
preme Court and the lower federal courts have shown an increasing pro-
clivity to defend a more competitive norm, to confine attention to economic
results, to limit the spheres of lawful trade advantage to the legislative mini-
mum, and to bring the legal concept of monopoly more in harmony with the
economic. 64 Thus, patents have been invalidated where not clearly an in-
made when the acquired corporation is banlwupt or approaching insolvency. Recognizing
the danger of such exceptions, courts have nonetheless given weight to this factor in the
past. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U.S. 291 (1930);
Aluminum Co. of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed. 361 (C.C.A. 3d 1924);
In re Pressed Steel Car Co. of N.J., 16 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Pa. 1936); see Beegle v. Thomson,
138 F.2d 875, 881 (C.C.A. 7th 1943). And it would seem that such compromises with
theory might more advantageously be made by the Commission charged vith enforcing the
statute than by the judiciary.
63. At the time the bill was first introduced, it .as expected to pass the House of
Representatives and to meet with difficulty in the Senate. Curb on Mergers, Busines3 Veelz,
Jan. 5, 1946, p. 18. Although the proposed amendments have twice received the unanimous
approval of the House Judiciary Committee, the Rules Committee has been unwilling to
make possible their consideration by the House. H.R. REP. No. 1480, 79th Cong., 2d Sees.
(1946) (H.R. 4810); H.R. RP. No. 1820, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (H.R. 5535). S e
note 42 supra. The change in political complexion between the 79th and 80th Congresses
would not seem to improve the chance of passage of this legislation.
64. Berge, Anti-Trust Enforcemenwtt in the War and Postwar Period, 12 GEo. WAsH. L.
REv. 371 (1944); Knauth, M1onopoly Reconsidered, 60 POL. Scr. Q. 563 (1945); Rostow, supra
note 12; Simons, Economic Stability and Anti-Trust Policy, 11 U. op Car. L. Rnv. 33S (1944);
15 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 243 (1947).
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novation, patent pools and restrictive licensing forbidden, and trademarks
narrowly protected. 5
In such cases as Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co.66 and International
Salt Co. v. United StatesP the Court has displayed an awareness of the in-
tended prophylactic purpose of the anti-trust laws, saying that it is the
tendency to monopoly that is forbidden, and that "it is immaterial that
the tendency is a creeping one rather than one that proceeds at full gallop.,"6
In American Tobacco Company v. United States 6 9 the Court ruled that a
conviction under the Sherman Act for conspiracy to monopolize might be
obtained where only the symptoms of monopoly, rather than an express
agreement, were visible, symptoms which might as probably have been
dictated by self-interest as by a conspiracy. Thus, even if a standard synon-
ymous with that of the Sherman Act be adopted for Section 7, that standard
now has changed. A court willing to infer a monopolistic practice in the
industrial pattern of the Tobacco case would be most unlikely to permit
major steps in the evolution of a similar pattern.
If there is to be any consistency in the clearly indicated judicial trend
which has made of the Sherman Act and of Section 3 of the Clayton Act
effective weapons against monopolistic tendencies, it would seem unlikely
that the Court'will overlook the opportunity to utilize Section 7 in a similar
direction.
Judicial revitalization of Section 7 could take three forms: a reinterpreta-
tion of the meaning of the clause: "where the effect of such acquisition may
be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock
is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition"; a reconsidera-
tion of the Thatclzer and Arrow-Hart rules, which permit acquisition of assets
by control of unlawfully acquired stock; and a re-examination of whether
asset acquisition is beyond the scope of Section 7.
Reinterpretation of the first standard of Section 7 could take so many
forms that it is valueless to speculate on which particular meaning the Court
might choose to adopt. A literal reading could prohibit almost every merger,
and it is not impossible that a Court which has shown such antipathy toward
monopolistic tendencies might choose to set up such a bar. Furthermore,
even if the Court did little to change the existing interpretation of the stand-
65. Henderson and Henderson, Patent Licenses and the Anti-Trust Laws, 24 Nrm. L.
REv. 225 (1945); Marcus, Patents, Anti-Trust Law and Anti-Trust Judgments through Hart.
ford-Empire, 34 Gao. L. J. 1 (1945); Taggart, Trademarks: Monopoly or Competition, 43
Micu. L. REv. 659 (1945); Zlinkoff, Monopoly versus Competition: Significant Trends in
Patent, Anti-Trust, Trademark, and Unfair Competition Suits, 53 YALE L. J. 514 (1944);
Note, 45 CoL.. L. REv. 601 (1945). But see Zlinkoff and Barnard, The Supreme Court and a
Competitive Economy: 1946 Term, 47 COL. L. REv. 914 (1947).
66. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
67. 68 Sup. Ct. 12 (1947).
68. Id'. at 15.
69. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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ard, its more favorable attitude toward administrative findings of fact ,
could restore a measure of viability to Section 7. Thus, an FTC finding
that a merger would tend to "substantially lessen competition" can be ex-
pected to receive a more favorable response today than it would have during
the first two decades of the Clayton Act's enforcement.
As to the limitation on the Commission's power imposed by the Thatcher
and Arrow-Hart decisions, it may be enough to point to the protests of jus-
tices whose dissenting opinions have often been indicative of future trends
in the law.71 In view of the weakness of these two precedents, the Federal
Trade Commission is open to criticism for complaining annually without
having relitigated the issue before the present Court.
Even the major detour of merger by sale of assets cannot be considered
inviolable, though here a prediction of change is far more speculative. At
the turn of the century, corporate combination was most often effected
through the holding company device. Asset acquisition might have been
omitted from the 1914 Act because of inability to foresee its widespread use
as a substitute method, and judicial inclusion might now be held warranted
to consummate the legislative purposeY2 The Court could sustain itself iith
such a rationale, but the pendency of the present bill, the specific wording
of the Act, and the common assumption that asset acquisition is not within
the scope of the Act, tend to negate this possibility.
CONCLUSION
Legislative revitalization of Section 7 of the Clayton Act is the most
desirable method of giving new life to a statute which expresses the public's
concern with the deleterious effects of the concentration of economic power.
If such legislative action should not take place, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Department of Justice would be remiss if they did not accom-
pany a drive for more thorough enforcement of the law with an attempt to
secure from the Supreme Court a judicial revitalization of the section.
70. For discussion of the change in the Court's attitude, see Stern, Rerfew of Findings of
Administrators, Judges, and Juries: A Comparatire AnaLsis, 58 HAnv. L. REv. 70 (1944);
see also Merrill, Judicial Review of Administrative Proccedings, A Fundional Prospeclus, 23
NEB. L. REVr. 56 (1944).
71. Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Stone, and Chief Justice Taft dissented in the Th'atcher
case, while Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, Stone, and Chief Justice Hughes were the dissenters
in the Arrow-Hart case.
72. 1945 HEARINGS 34, 42. The sponsors of the present legislation regard the Con-
gressional failure to include asset acquisition in the Clayton Act as "an oversight." Id. at 5,
15. See also Comment, 39 YALE L. J. 1042 (1930); Comment, 75 U. OF P. L. Rzv. 463
(1927); 38 YALE L. J. 830 (1929). But see 1947 HEARINGs 293.
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